PARTNERS IN ECONOMIC CRIME

By applying the theory of convenience, Partners in Economic Crime gains and presents insights into the phenomenon of cartels. This theory suggests that behind deviant behavior by corporate executives across many industries, there lie motives, opportunities, and, crucially, willingness. Within these pages are explained both cartel characteristics and convenience characteristics, each informed by presentations and explanations of recent case studies. In market economies, companies in the same industry are expected to compete with one another. However, one may well ask the question "would it not be more convenient for competing companies to cooperate with each other?" - this would certainly seem to avoid threats and allow each company to gain from joint possibilities. The central rationale behind this book is to explain the motives, the opportunities, and the willingness behind the deviant behavior committed by offenders as cartel members. Put simply, you cannot fight something that you don't understand, just as you cannot fight someone that you don't understand. This is why these insights into the cartel phenomenon are provided and supported by convenience analysis, accounting for how corporate executives vary in their convenience orientation and specificity. The reduction of opportunities for committing and concealing wrongdoing, as well as diminishing the situations in which potential offenders have both the motive and the willingness for deviance must be a priority for antitrust enforcement targeting.