Internet and Network Economics

Recent Developments in Learning and Competition with Finite Automata (Extended Abstract).- Dynamic Mechanism Design.- Unconditional Competitive Auctions with Copy and Budget Constraints.- Truthful Auctions with Optimal Profit.- Mechanisms with Verification for Any Finite Domain.- Pure Nash Equilibria in Player-Specific and Weighted Congestion Games.- On the Complexity of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria in Congestion and Local-Effect Games.- Strong and Correlated Strong Equilibria in Monotone Congestion Games.- The Equilibrium Existence Problem in Finite Network Congestion Games.- First-Passage Percolation on a Width-2 Strip and the Path Cost in a VCG Auction.- Optimal Cost-Sharing Mechanisms for Steiner Forest Problems.- Mechanisms to Induce Random Choice.- Bayesian Optimal No-Deficit Mechanism Design.- Succinct Approximation of Trade-Off Curves.- Game-Theoretic Aspects of Designing Hyperlink Structures.- Competing for Customers in a Social Network: The Quasi-linear Case.- Selfish Service Installation in Networks.- Games of Connectivity.- Assignment Problems in Rental Markets.- On Portfolio's Default-Risk-Adjusted Duration and Value: Model and Algorithm Based on Copulas.- Price Roll-Backs and Path Auctions: An Approximation Scheme for Computing the Market Equilibrium.- New Results on Rationality and Strongly Polynomial Time Solvability in Eisenberg-Gale Markets.- Making Economic Theory Operational.- Sparse Games Are Hard.- Market Equilibria with Hybrid Linear-Leontief Utilities.- Polynomial Algorithms for Approximating Nash Equilibria of Bimatrix Games.- A Note on Approximate Nash Equilibria.- Ranking Sports Teams and the Inverse Equal Paths Problem.- Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Wardrop Games.- Wardrop Equilibria and Price of Stability for Bottleneck Games withSplittable Traffic.- A Worm Propagation Model Based on People's Email Acquaintance Profiles.- Mixed Strategies in Combinatorial Agency.- The Sound of Silence: Mining Implicit Feedbacks to Compute Reputation.- Strongly Polynomial-Time Truthful Mechanisms in One Shot.- Secretary Problems with Competing Employers.