In War's Shadow | At the Edge of the Cold War

About the Book We are now two decades removed from the U.S. and allied victory in the Cold War, caused by the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain. In Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan (for the Soviets) the Cold War became hot and bloody, rising to mid-intensity levels. For the most part, the Cold War was waged via standing forces and through the readiness of air defense and nuclear missile systems to defend or retaliate against any sudden attack. We tend to forget, though, that in the more than four decades of that conflict, the actions generally happened on the periphery away from the main front along the "inter-German border" in Europe, or the secondary front along the Demilitarized Zone in Korea. These actions often happened "in the shadows" along this periphery through intelligence and counterintelligence operations, and through U.S. and Soviet support for proxies in conflicts that might have begun over local or internal disputes. This support from both sides was generally both economic and military. The locations were in those areas of the world described variously as the Third World, the Lesser Developed Countries, or Developing Countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. This book explores one of those "shadow" battlefronts. It was the edge of the Cold War and America's last stand against communism right at our very doorstep. On March 22, 1986, initial reports filtered in about the Nicaraguan incursion. The Sandinista forces, over two thousand strong, had crossed into Honduras in hot pursuit of a force of contra rebels. The new Honduran president, Jose Azcona Hoyo, wanted American support to move his troops and artillery to the battlefield. Palmerola Air Base was in good shape to support him. The Honduran plan was essentially to isolate the area of the incursion and allow the Sandinistas and the contras to slug it out. Using American airlift, they moved several hundred of their infantry and a few pieces of artillery into a cordon around the penetration. The Sandinistas were smart enough not to force the situation. Unfortunately, for the communists, the contras slipped a force in behind them, cutting them off from Nicaragua. The battle lasted several days. Far from being the ineffective force portrayed in the media, the contras were kicking butt. About the Author Rick Waddell is a businessman currently living in Sao Paulo, Brazil. A native of Arkansas, he graduated from West Point in 1982, and holds advanced degrees from Oxford, Webster, and Columbia. He continues to serve in the U.S. Army Reserve.