Deterrence

Reassessing the role of nuclear deterrence Although deterrence will not disappear, current and future threats to international security will present relatively fewer situations in which deterrence, least of all nuclear deterrence, will be the most effective tool of statecraft. Drawn from the third in a series of conferences at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University on the nuclear legacy of the cold war, this report summarizes the contributors' findings on the importance of deterrence, from its critical function in the cold war to its current role. The contributors discuss how, with today's international environment being radically different from that which it was during the cold war, the need is pressing to reassess the role of deterrence in whatever form it may take to meet the challenges of the world as it now exists. This use of American influence--a resource of which deterrence is only one part--can foster expectations that trend toward favoring less reliance on nuclear weapons, not more. This summary report concludes with remarks by George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, Senator Sam Nunn, and Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Admiral Michael Mullen. CONTRIBUTORS: James Acton, Steve Andreasen, Sidney Drell, Christopher A. Ford, Michael Gerson, James Goodby, David Holloway, Edward Ifft, Raymond Jeanloz, Michael Mazarr, John McLaughlin, Patrick Morgan, George Quester. This summary report also includes remarks by George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, Senator Sam Nunn, and Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Admiral Michael Mullen.